I was
reading the other day Mr. Dickinson's memoir of the late and
lamented Mr. McTaggart, that philosopher-saint whose lectures on
Kant and Hegel I had the privilege to attend as an advanced
student of Trinity College, Cambridge, about a quarter of a
century ago. I should like to note a few points which occurred to
me while reading this interesting book whose value is very much
enhanced by the personal reminiscences of those who had the good
fortune of coming into contact with that great thinker.
"As we have pointed out more than once," says Mr. Dickinson,
"the origin of McTaggart's philosophy was not in his intellect but
in his emotions." This is true—perhaps more or less true of all
thinkers—if we look at McTaggart as a thinker torn asunder from
the general current of British thought. In order to understand the
true significance of his philosophy we must put him back into that
current.
Ultimate RealityAgnosticism is not a permanent mode of thought. It comes and
goes. The British mind tried to escape from it in two ways. One is
the total elimination of what is called the Ultimate Reality. The
"Unknown and Unknowable" of Herbert Spencer simply does not exist.
Why then look for it? The Universe is nothing but perishable
phenomena without any eternal reality behind. The other way is
that an Eternal Reality does exist behind the world of perishable
phenomena and is approachable by a purely speculative method. The
first course was adopted by Hume, the second by Green. In
opposition to British Phenomenalism, Green affirmed the existence
of an Eternal Consciousness. The temporal process, according to
Green, is unthinkable without a non-temporal consciousness; for
consciousness of change cannot be identical with the process of
change. But the eternal consciousness so regarded is nothing more
than a Newtonian Space holding the world of eternally interrelated
appearances. This view makes it impossible to develop the living
concrete self out of a dead immobile system of abstract relations.
Bradley's philosophy is the logical outcome of Green. The
criterion of reality is coherence and freedom from contradiction.
Applying this test, the world of appearance, time, change,
movement, multiplicity turns out to be a mere illusion. The
Ultimate Reality is one and immutable. This is the ancient Hindu
doctrine of "mava" and the Greek Parmenides again. But how did
this illusion originate? Nobody knows. Bradley, however, admits in
spite of the contradiction involved in the notion of self that the
human self must, in some sense, be real. In what sense is it real?
He does not explain. McTaggart reaches the Absolute by means of
dialectic method but he does not stop at the Absolute. The
Absolute according to him further differentiates itself into
concrete Egos. The Universe is not an illusion; it is a system of
real selves which cannot be regarded as mere predicates or
adjectives of the Absolute. As he wrote to me in December 1919:
"I agree with you, as you know, in regarding quite untenable
the view that finite beings are adjectives of the Absolute.
Whatever they are, it is quite certain to me that they are not
that."
In this aspect of his teaching, McTaggart is much more
genuinely British than either Bradley or Green or Bosanquet.
Indeed he was to Hegel as Liebniz was to Spinoza. Thus the
character of McTaggart's philosophy was determined not so much by
his private emotions as by the intellectual difficulties as well
as the un-British character of neo-Hegelian thought in England. It
was also determined by what he called the needs of his country. I
quote from another letter of 1920 which he appears to have written
after he had read Nicholson's English translation of my Secrets
of Self:
"I am writing to tell you with how much pleasure I have been
reading your poems. Have you not changed your position very much?
Surely in the days when we used to talk philosophy together, you
were more of a pantheistic and mystic.
For my own part I adhere to my own belief that selves are the
Ultimate Reality, but as to their true content and their true good
my position is, as it was, that it is to be found in Eternity and
not in time, and in love rather than action.
Perhaps, however, the difference is largely a question of
emphasis—we each lay most weight on what our own country needs. I
dare say you are right when you say that India is too
contemplative. But I am sure that England—and all Europe—is not
contemplative enough. That is a lesson that we ought to learn from
you—and no doubt we have something to teach in return."
Mystical intuition as a source of knowledge
The point of interest in McTaggart's philosophy, however, is
that in his system, mystical intuition as a source of knowledge is
much more marked than in the system of Bradley. The need of such a
direct revelation is the natural outcome of the failure of a
purely speculative method. An Italian writer describes McTaggart's
philosophy as mystical degeneration of English neo-Hegelianism.
Nothing of the kind. Some of the greatest minds of the world which
have felt the need of a direct contact with the Ultimate Reality,
have indeed in some cases achieved such contact. Plotinus,
Ghazzali, and Bergson are instances in this point. In his
spiritual evolution Kant himself reaches that stage but unlike
Ghazzali and others he was led to conceive the Ultimate Reality as
a regulative idea only. The result of his critical act was as
if He does exist. Not William James but Kant was the real
founder of modern Pragmatism. Will then the Italian writer
referred to above, describe Kant's philosophy as pragmatic
degeneration of German thought?
It must, however, be remembered in the case of McTaggart that
the mystic revelation of Reality came to him as a confirmation of
his thought. His system is deductive not in the sense in which the
philosophy of Bergson and Plotinus is deductive. He started with a
firm conviction in the power of human reason and that conviction
remained with him to the end of his days. His illumination came, I
think, as an accidental confirmation of what he had reached
through pure reason. That is why he had such an unshakable faith
in his wife: "I am grieved that we must part, but you know I am
not afraid of death." Such a triumphant faith is the result of a
direct revelation alone. And this revelation has nothing to do
with what our psychology calls emotion, it is as Mrs. McTaggart
rightly insists "actual perception of the senses." Like a true
mystic McTaggart rarely mentioned his experiences to others. The
ultimate basis of religion is an experience which is essentially
individual and incommunicable. It is because of its private
character that mystics see no use in talking about it except to
experts and that too for the purpose of verification only. In the
history of Islamic mysticism we find many recorded instances in
which some mystics have been reported to have traveled thousands
of miles for the verification of a single experience. This is
technically known as "tasdiq", i.e. verification by an
appeal to another man's experience. Knowledge and direct
revelation are not mutually opposed; they are complementary to
each other. The philosophical theologian simply tries, for the
sake of fortunate persons, to socialize through reason what is
essentially individual. When the mystic Sultan Abu Said met the
philosopher Abu Ali Ibn Sina, he is reported to have said: "I
see what he knows." McTaggart both knew and saw; but his
vision I believe did not precede his system. It did not initially
inspire his thought, though it did bring to him the warmth of
conviction. This to my mind indicates a far more powerful
intellect than that of Plotinus or Bergson. Yet the vision of
McTaggart, in view of its static character, is not free from the
unhealthy influences of Hegelian inspiration. But perhaps we
possess no criterion to decide whether the Universe in the
ultimate essence is at rest or in motion.
McTaggart's view of the Self
Another point on which I would like to say a few words is
McTaggart's view of the Self. Hegel's indifference to personal
immortality has more or less affected all those who received
inspiration from him. With Bosanquet and Bradley the Self is not a
substance in the sense of Spinoza. It is a construction of
thought, a mere predicate or adjective of the Absolute. And this
selfhood according to these thinkers is further transcended in the
Absolute. This account of the Self disregards even the elementary
conditions of selfhood as known to living experience. It is much
more than a mere predicate of the Absolute; it is a dynamic centre
of experience. By this criticism of the common neo-Hegelian view
of the Self I do not mean to argue for McTaggart's view. All that
I mean is to show how his mind tried to escape from the result of
English neo-Hegelianism. To McTaggart the Self is a real
substance. He reached the Absolute through the method of Hegel.
But with him the Absolute has further determinations, i.e.
the egos of actual experience which participate in the elementary
eternity of the Absolute. This amounts to a total dismissal of the
Hegelian Absolute. But the result of this dismissal is not a
return to Empiricism. It gives us not a world of interrelated
appearances but a living world of interrelated egos. Mr. Dickinson
thinks that it cuts out science at one stroke. It does nothing of
the kind any more than the spiritual pluralism of Liebniz. But
while I agree that the Self is more than a mere predicate of the
Absolute, I cannot agree with McTaggart in the view that the Self
is elementally immortal. From the mere fact that the individual
Ego is a differentiation of the eternal Absolute, it by no means
follows that even in its finitude the human Self retains the
character, which belongs to its source. To my mind such a
differentiation should give it only a capacity for immortality and
not immortality itself. Personally I regard immortality as an
inspiration and not something eternally achieved. Man is a
candidate for immortal life, which involves a ceaseless struggle
in maintaining the tension of the Ego. I venture here to quote one
or two passages from my poem called "The New Garden of Mystery":
"If you say that "Ego" is merely a superstitious thing, and its
appearance is just like any other fantastic thing in the world,
then tell me who has caused that doubt in your mind? Once
look into yourself, and tell me who is the Invisible Being that
dwells within you?1 Obviously the world exists, and still it
requires some arguments for its existence, and it can't be grasped
even by a Gabriel! On the other hand, however, Ego is concealed
(in our mind), and does not require any argument for its
existence,—once think well what is the secret behind its
activities? Now, take your "Self" to be a Truth (fact), and don't
think there is any touch of Evil in it. Never imagine that "Self"
(Ego) is a Farm without any produce! When your "Self" becomes
mature, it is immortal, for the separation of true
lovers is itself a Union! Yea, we can easy attach speedy
wings to a spark even, so it can be restless for all the time
to come. Even an everlasting Truth isn't the exact Reward
of the labour of our "Self", for its own Eternity isn't achieved
only by seeking! In fact, the real Eternity is that our
soul should be strengthened by ecstasy of Love! Then, why
should we fear Death?—When our "Self" (Ego) is mature, it
is absolutely free from Death! Nevertheless, my body as well as my
heart and spirit, trembles with the fear of another Death!
And what is that Death!—To be deprived of Love and Ecstasy, and to
be incapable of throwing our Spark into the trash of Evil!2 This is
the moment, when we see our Death with our own eyes, and prepare
our Shroud with our own hands! Remember! This kind of Death
is always in ambush for you, and fear it,3 for our real
Death is this one!"
But while I disagree with McTaggart in his view of immortality,
I regard this part of his work as almost apostolic. He emphasized
personal immortality even at the expense of the transcendent God
of Christian theology, at a time when this important belief was
decaying in Europe and when the European man was about to face
death on an enormous scale. Indeed in this aspect of his work he
may be compared to the great Muslim mystic Hallaj whose undying
phrase "I am the creative Truth" was thrown as a challenge to the
whole Muslim world at a time when Muslim scholastic thought was
moving in a direction which tended to obscure the reality and
destiny of the human Ego. Hallaj never ceased to utter what he had
personally seen to be the truth until the mullas of Islam
prevailed upon the State to imprison him and finally to crucify
him. He met his death with perfect calm.
McTaggart's Atheism
There is one more point which I would like briefly to consider
here—I mean his atheism. I used to meet him almost every day in
his rooms in Trinity and very often our talk turned on the
question of God. His powerful logic often silenced me but he never
succeeded in convincing me. There is no doubt, as Mr. Dickinson
points out in his memoir that he had a positive dislike for the
transcendent God of Western theology. The Absolute of the
neo-Hegelian lacks life and movement. The Eternal Consciousness of
Green is hardly distinguishable from Newtonian Space. How could
these satisfy him? In a letter already quote he wrote to me:
"As far as the life of the individual remains the same in the
course of amplification and expression, I am inclined to think
(for a European you can also be mystic) that the solution rests in
loving the same persons. But indeed it still seems to me, as it
did when we first knew one another, that the solution of all
problems is found in Love."
Indeed his description of Love as the essence of Reality
indicates that in spite of his thoroughgoing intellectualism, his
soul revolted against the inert Absolute of neo-Hegelianism. Yet
in a letter from which I have quoted above, he seems to oppose
love to action. I do not see the opposition. Love is not
passivity. It is active and creative. Indeed on the material
plane, it is the only force which circumvents death; for when
death carries away one generation, love creates another. He tells
us that this is the love of one person for another; and further it
is the cause and the effect of the proximity of two persons. Now
it is because of its character as an active cause that in spite of
variety in content of the mutual loves of various persons, it is
capable of being experienced as a unity embracing the
entire Universe. But the crucial point is whether this central
unity is an all-inclusive Self. This was McTaggart's real
difficulty. How could one Self, however superior, include other
selves. The Self is unique and impervious. The mystic poet Rumi
felt the same difficulty. "Between the individual egos and their
Sustainer", he says "obtains a contact which can neither be
imagined nor intellectually conceived." In his Idea of God,
Professor Pringle-Pattison also regards this relation as
inscrutable by human intellect. But is not the individual Ego
himself a colony of Egos?